this manner, but
as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and
yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which
is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 4]

Whether Grace Is in the Essence of the Soul As in a Subject, or in
One of the Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the
soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says
(Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that
grace is related to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his
horse." Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above (I,
Q. 83, A. 2). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject.

Obj. 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine says
(De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which
proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a
power of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of
grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of
grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would
be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the
proper subject of grace.

Obj. 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now
what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it
follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we
suppose no part or power of the soul--viz. neither the will, nor the
intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.

_On the contrary,_ By grace we are born again sons of God. But
generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore
grace is in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.

_I answer that,_ This question depends on the preceding. For if grace
is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the
soul as in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject
of virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 1). But if grace differs from
virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of
grace, since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of
virtue, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 1; Q. 56, A. 1). Hence it remains
that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the
powers of the soul, so that i