Hence a man can merit nothing
from God.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his
debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's
debtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to
Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" Hence no one can merit
anything from God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 31:16): "There is a reward for
thy work." Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit.
Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God.
_I answer that,_ Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward
means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price
for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for
anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to
make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as
is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is
simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no
absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice,
but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a
father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says.
And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of
merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only
relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively,
in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child
merits something from his father and the slave from his lord.
Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest
inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from
God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man
and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate
after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is
in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the
presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from
God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of
operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and
operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God;
differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act
by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which
is not so in other creatures.
Reply Obj. 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his
free-will; otherwise th
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