ainst Tyre . . .
and there hath been no reward given him," and further on: "And it
shall be wages for his army . . . I have given him the land of Egypt
because he hath labored for me." Therefore temporal goods fall under
merit.

Obj. 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on
account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal
punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gen. 19. Hence temporal
goods fall under merit.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ What falls under merit does not come upon
all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike;
according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and
the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the
unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth
sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.

_I answer that,_ What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which
is a kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the
second, relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according
to Ps. 72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and
consequently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall
simply under merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is
what is good to him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and
this does not fall under merit simply, but relatively.

Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are
useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall
directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and
everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the
first grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal
goods to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these
temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For
there is no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I
have not seen the just forsaken," etc.

But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are
not man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall
under merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God
to do temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their
purpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the
works of justice in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above
(AA. 3, 6), so have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the
nature of reward, with respe