out the advice of his ministers, and his ministers
for submitting to be kept in ignorance of transactions which deeply
concerned the honour of the Crown and the welfare of the nation. Yet
surely the presumption is that what the most honest and honourable men
of both parties, Nottingham, for example, among the Tories, and Somers
among the Whigs, not only did, but avowed, cannot have been altogether
inexcusable; and a very sufficient excuse will without difficulty be
found.

The doctrine that the Sovereign is not responsible is doubtless as old
as any part of our constitution. The doctrine that his ministers are
responsible is also of immemorial antiquity. That where there is
no responsibility there can be no trustworthy security against
maladministration, is a doctrine which, in our age and country, few
people will be inclined to dispute. From these three propositions it
plainly follows that the administration is likely to be best conducted
when the Sovereign performs no public act without the concurrence and
instrumentality of a minister. This argument is perfectly sound. But we
must remember that arguments are constructed in one way, and governments
in another. In logic, none but an idiot admits the premises and denies
the legitimate conclusion. But in practice, we see that great and
enlightened communities often persist, generation after generation, in
asserting principles, and refusing to act upon those principles. It
may be doubted whether any real polity that ever existed has exactly
corresponded to the pure idea of that polity. According to the pure idea
of constitutional royalty, the prince reigns and does not govern; and
constitutional royalty, as it now exists in England, comes nearer than
in any other country to the pure idea. Yet it would be a great error
to imagine that our princes merely reign and never govern. In the
seventeenth century, both Whigs and Tories thought it, not only the
right, but the duty, of the first magistrate to govern. All parties
agreed in blaming Charles the Second for not being his own Prime
Minister; all parties agreed in praising James for being his own Lord
High Admiral; and all parties thought it natural and reasonable that
William should be his own Foreign Secretary.

It may be observed that the ablest and best informed of those who
have censured the manner in which the negotiations of that time were
conducted are scarcely consistent with themselves. For, while they blame
Will