er
twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and
depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.
He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by
way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full
rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements
were coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while
Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga,
Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a
struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on
the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to
reinforce Longstreet. He also started another division a day later, but
our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it
back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to
Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter
blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what
was going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to
the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of
Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.
They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of
the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew
it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of
view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the
Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was
therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet,
cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had captured
Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It
would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from
Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the
besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen
ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we
were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:
but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of
them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands
who deserted, but little reliance can be