ion of economic justice as the maintenance of social function.
They serve also to show that the true resources of the State are larger
and more varied than is generally supposed. The true function of
taxation is to secure to society the element in wealth that is of social
origin, or, more broadly, all that does not owe its origin to the
efforts of living individuals. When taxation, based on these principles,
is utilized to secure healthy conditions of existence to the mass of the
people it is clear that this is no case of robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Peter is not robbed. Apart from the tax it is he who would be robbing
the State. A tax which enables the State to secure a certain share of
social value is not something deducted from that which the taxpayer has
an unlimited right to call his own, but rather a repayment of something
which was all along due to society.

But why should the proceeds of the tax go to the poor in particular?
Granting that Peter is not robbed, why should Paul be paid? Why should
not the proceeds be expended on something of common concern to Peter and
Paul alike, for Peter is equally a member of the community? Undoubtedly
the only just method of dealing with the common funds is to expend them
in objects which subserve the common good, and there are many directions
in which public expenditure does in fact benefit all classes alike.
This, it is worth noting, is true even of some important branches of
expenditure which in their direct aim concern the poorer classes.
Consider, for example, the value of public sanitation, not merely to the
poorer regions which would suffer first if it were withheld, but to the
richer as well who, seclude themselves as they may, cannot escape
infection. In the old days judge and jury, as well as prisoners, would
die of gaol fever. Consider, again, the economic value of education, not
only to the worker, but to the employer whom he will serve. But when all
this is allowed for it must be admitted that we have throughout
contemplated a considerable measure of public expenditure in the
elimination of poverty. The prime justification of this expenditure is
that the prevention of suffering from the actual lack of adequate
physical comforts is an essential element in the common good, an object
in which all are bound to concern themselves, which all have the right
to demand and the duty to fulfil. Any common life based on the
avoidable suffering even of one of those who partake in