posal had been put to the constituencies twice over,
and had been ratified by them if any legislative proposal ever was
ratified. It should enable the House of Commons, as the representatives
of the people, to decide freely on the permanent constitution of the
country. The Bill itself, however, does not lay down the lines of a
permanent settlement. For, to begin with, in leaving the constitution of
the House of Lords unaltered it provides a one-sided check, operating
only on democratic measures which in any case have to run the gauntlet
of the permanent officials, the judges, the Press, and Society. For
permanent use the brake must be two-sided. Secondly, it is to be feared
that the principle of delay would be an insufficient check upon a large
and headstrong majority. What is really needed is that the people should
have the opportunity of considering a proposal afresh. This could be
secured in either of two ways: (1) by allowing the suspensory veto of
the Second Chamber to hold a measure over to a new Parliament; (2) by
allowing the House of Commons to submit a bill in the form in which it
finally leaves the House to a direct popular vote. It is to my mind
regrettable that so many Liberals should have closed the door on the
Referendum. It is true that there are many measures to which it would be
ill suited. For example, measures affecting a particular class or a
particular locality would be apt to go by the board. They might command
a large and enthusiastic majority among those primarily affected by
them, but only receive a languid assent elsewhere, and they might be
defeated by a majority beaten up for extraneous purposes among those
without first-hand knowledge of the problems with which they are
intended to deal. Again, if a referendum were to work at all it would
only be in relation to measures of the first class, and only, if the
public convenience is to be consulted, on very rare occasions. In all
ordinary cases of insuperable difference between the Houses, the
government of the day would accept the postponement of the measure till
the new Parliament. But there are measures of urgency, measures of
fundamental import, above all, measures which cut across the ordinary
lines of party, and with which, in consequence, our system is impotent
to deal, and on these the direct consultation of the people would be the
most suitable method of solution.[13]

What we need, then, is an impartial second chamber distinctly
subord