arrisoned.

The learned professor notes with bitter contempt that no wines, spirits,
cigars, or "other customary delicacies" were supplied to our prisoners,
and that the German officers received very little more than the rations
served to their men. The professor makes no mention of one or two other
pertinent facts in this connection; as, for example, that none of these
"customary delicacies" were supplied to the British troops. We may
endure his reproaches with the more fortitude, I think, when we remember
that the German Government absolutely ignored our invitation to send
weekly shipments of supplies under a white flag for the towns they had
garrisoned on British soil.

It is known that the officers in command of the German forces in England
had previously maintained a very lavish and luxurious scale of living;
in the same way that, since the invasion of England, extravagance was
said to have reached unparallelled heights in Germany itself. But the
British Government which had reached depletion of our own supplies, by
assisting our prisoners to maintain a luxurious scale of living while
held as hostages, would certainly have forfeited the confidence of the
public, and justly so. Upon the whole, it is safe to say that German
sneers at British parsimony and Puritanism may fairly be accepted as
tribute, and, as such, need in no sense be resented.

As soon as we received Germany's cynical reply to Britain's demand for a
complete withdrawal of all the invasion claims, it became evident that
the war was to be a prolonged and bitter one, and that no further
purpose could be served by the original British plan of campaign, which,
as its object had been the freeing of our own soil, had been based on
the assumption that the defeat and capture of the invader's forces would
be sufficient. Troops had to be despatched at once to South Africa,
where German overlordship had aroused the combined opposition of the
Boers and the British. This opposition burst at once into open
hostility immediately the news of England's declaration of war reached
South Africa. While the Boers and the British, united in a common cause,
were carrying war into German Southwest Africa, troops from German East
Africa were said to have landed in Delagoa Bay, and to be advancing
southward.

In all this, the British cause was well served by Germany's initial
blunder; by the huge mistake which cost her four-fifths of her naval
strength at a blow. This mista