ke in Germany's policy was distinctly
traceable to one cause: the national arrogance which, since the
invasion, had approached near to madness; which had now led Germany into
contemptuously underrating the striking power still remaining in the
British Navy. It was true that, prior to the invasion, our Navy had been
consistently starved and impoverished by "The Destroyers." It was that,
of course, which had first earned them their title. But Germany herself,
when she struck her great blow at England, hardly wounded the British
Navy at all. Her cunning had drawn our ships into a Mediterranean
impasse when they were sadly needed upon our coasts, and her strategy
had actually destroyed one British line of battle-ship, one cruiser, and
two gunboats. But that was the whole extent of the naval damage
inflicted by her at the time of the invasion. But the lesson she gave at
the same time was of incalculable value to us. The ships she destroyed
had been manned by practically untrained, short-handed crews, hurriedly
rushed out of Portsmouth barracks. Yet German arrogance positively
inspired Berlin with the impression that the Navies of the two countries
had tried conclusions, and that our fleet had been proved practically
ineffective.

Prior to the invasion our Navy had indeed reached a low ebb. Living
always in barracks, under the pernicious system gradually forced upon
the country by "The Destroyers" in the name of economy, our bluejackets
had fallen steadily from their one high standard of discipline and
efficiency into an incompetent, sullen, half-mutinous state, due solely
to the criminal parsimony and destructive neglect of an Administration
which aimed at "peace at any price," and adopted, of all means, the
measures most calculated to provoke foreign attack. But, since the
invasion, an indescribable spirit of emulation, a veritable fury of
endeavour, had welded the British fleet into a formidable state of
efficiency.

First "The Destroyers," actuated by a combination of panic and remorse,
and then the first Free Government, representing the convinced feeling
of the public, had lavished liberality upon the Navy since the invasion.
Increased pay, newly awakened patriotism, the general change in the
spirit of the age, all had combined to fill the Admiralty recruiting
offices with applicants. Almost all our ships had been kept practically
continuously at sea. "The Destroyers'" murderous policy in naval matters
had been comple