he idol of the German populace, and the bugbear of the
Allied countries. But he has done nothing since. Soon after Tannenberg
he made a fool of himself on the Russian frontier, and showed that
success had got into his head. He subsequently initiated several
terrific attempts, all of which were excessively costly and none of
which was carried through. If he has not ceased to be an idol, he has
at any rate ceased to be a bugbear.

As for the average intelligence of the opposing forces, it may be said
that Prussian prestige, though it dies very slowly, is dying, even in
the minds of our pessimists. Their zest for elaborate organization of
plan gave the Germans an immense advantage at the start, but it is
proved that, once the plan has gone wrong, they are at the best not
better in warfare than ourselves. Their zest for discipline, and their
reserves, have enabled them to stave off a catastrophe longer than
perhaps any other nation could have staved it off. But time is now
showing that excessive discipline and organization produce defects
which ultimately outweigh the qualities they spring from. The tenacity
of the Germans is remarkable, but does it surpass ours? Man for man, a
soldier of the Allies is better than a soldier of the Central
Powers--or ten thousand observers have been deceived. As for the
intelligence of the publics upon whose moral the opposing forces
ultimately depend, it is undeniable that the German public is
extremely hysterical, and far more gullible even than ourselves at our
very worst. The legends believed by the German public today are
ridiculous enough to stamp Germany for a century as an arch-simpleton
among nations. Its vanity is stupendous, eclipsing all previously
known vanities. The Great General Staff must know fairly well how
matters stand, and yet not the mere ignorant public, but the King of
Bavaria himself, had the fatuity as late as last week to talk about
the new territory that Germany would annex as a result of the war!

In numbers we in the West had got the better of them, and were slowly
increasing our lead, before Italy, by joining us, increased the
Allies' advantage at a stroke by over three-quarters of a million
fully mobilised men, and much more than as many reserves.

In financial resources there is simply no comparison between the enemy
and ourselves. We are right out of sight of the enemy in this
fundamental affair.

We lack nothing--neither leading, nor brains, nor numbers