ived
that day after the battle), were thrown to the right of the road
properly speaking, the enemy's rear. But I would not permit an
attack to be commenced by our troops until I could hear from
McClernand, who was advancing with four divisions, two of them on
a road intersecting the Jackson road about one mile from where
the troops above described were placed, and about the centre of
the enemy's line; the other two divisions on a road still north
and nearly the same distance off.

I soon heard from McClernand, through members of his staff and my
own, whom I had sent to him early in the morning, and found that
by the nearest practicable route of communication he was two and
a half miles distant. I sent several successive messages to him
to push forward with all rapidity. There had been continuous
firing between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel advance, which
by 11 o'clock grew into a battle. For some time this division
bore the brunt of the conflict, but finding the enemy too strong
for them, at the instance of Hovey I directed first one and then
a second brigade from Crocker's division to re-enforce him. All
this time Logan's division was working upon the enemy's left and
rear and weakened his front attack most wonderfully. The troops
here opposing us evidently far outnumbered ours. Expecting
McClernand momentarily with four divisions, including Blair's, I
never felt a doubt at the result. He did not arrive, however,
until the enemy had been driven from the field, after a terrible
contest of hours, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded and
prisoners, and a number of pieces of artillery. It was found
afterward that the Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a
southerly direction for about one mile and to where it
intersected one of the Raymond roads, turns almost to the west,
down the hill and across the valley in which Logan was operating
on the rear of the enemy. One brigade of Logan's division had,
unconscious of this important fact, penetrated nearly to this
road and compelled the enemy to retreat to prevent capture. As it
was, much of his artillery and Loring's division of his army was
cut off, besides the prisoners captured. On the call of Hovey
for more re-enforcements, just before the rout of the enemy (p. 385)
commenced,