ke up, to a large extent at any rate, what we call moral
qualities. Darwin, however, saw further than this: he saw that, while
this might account for the development of what we may call savage and
barbarian virtues, there was in civilised mankind a development of
sympathy which went far beyond this, and which one could not with good
reason account for by asserting that it rendered assistance to the
community in its struggle for existence with other communities.
Thus, with regard to the former question, he says: "A tribe including
many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of
patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always
ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common
good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be
natural selection[1]."
[Footnote 1: Descent of Man, Part I. chap. v. p. 203 (new ed., 1901).]
But when he comes to the case of civilised men he finds a difficulty.
"With savages," he says, "the weak in body or mind are soon
eliminated; and those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state
of health. We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check
the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the
maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men
exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last
moment.... The aid which we feel impelled to give to the helpless is
mainly an incidental result of the instinct of sympathy, which was
originally acquired as part of the social instincts.... Nor could
we check our sympathy, even at the urging of hard reason, without
deterioration in the noblest part of our nature[1]." This sympathy,
which natural selection cannot preserve or vindicate even in the
struggle of communities, is nevertheless recognised by Darwin as
having a moral value outside of and above natural selection and the
struggle for existence,--a value of which these have no right to
judge. He thinks that if we followed hard reason--and by 'hard reason'
he obviously means an imitation on our part of the action of natural
selection--we should be led to sweep away all those institutions by
which civilised mankind guards its weaker members. But this, he says,
would be only to deteriorate the "noblest part of our nature." What is
noblest in our nature, then, is not that which natural selection has
favoured or maintained. There is, therefore, implied in his view a
lim
|