the unity reached will be mechanical. For the idealist,
on the other hand, reason may be said to be the central principle of
things: the unity of reality is a rational unity. I have contended in
these lectures that neither the mechanical unity of the naturalists
nor the rational unity of the idealists has succeeded in comprehending
within its unifying principle the essential nature of morality with
its deep-going dualism of good and evil. But while I have maintained
that even the conception of reality as the reproduction of itself by
an eternal self-consciousness is an inadequate conception, it is still
possible to hold that reality is a connected whole, and that its true
principle of unity is an ethical principle.

If I were asked what is meant by an ethical unity, I should answer, in
the first place, that it implies purpose. The unity of reality is not
exhibited by a description of its present or past conditions or even
by an account of its causal connexions. These modes of description are
all affected by the fragmentariness which always belongs to temporal
apprehension. But, when things are seen in the light of a purpose, a
view of them as a whole becomes possible, and the fragmentariness of
time is transcended. And, in the second place, I should say that an
ethical unity implies the presence within itself of different finite
centres of conscious activity, whose freedom is not inconsistent with
their relation to one another and to the Whole.

In his own life, so far as it is a moral life, each individual seeks
system or unity. And this unity is realised on three different
levels--as we may call them--which may be distinguished for clearness'
sake, though it is not possible actually to separate them. On each
level morality is realised through system, and system is brought about
by the rule of the morally higher and the submission of the morally
lower: in this goodness lies, in the opposite evil. If we isolate the
individual and consider him apart, he may be said to attain goodness
by the due ordering and control of his sensuous and passional
nature by rational or spiritual ends. The result may be described,
negatively, as the suppression of sensualism. But the positive
description remains imperfect until we can say what the rational
or spiritual principle is which is to weld all man's 'particular
impulses' into an organic whole.

And this cannot be done so long as we contemplate the mere individual
in isolation. W