od of those parts, because it was prohibited by another. And so on
without end. Doing anything unlucky is in their idea what putting on
something that attracts the electric fluid is in fact, you cannot be
sure that harm will not be done, not only to the person in fault, but
to those about him too. As in the Scriptural phrase, doing what is of
evil omen is 'like one that letteth out water.' He cannot tell what are
the consequences of his act, who will share them, or how they can be
prevented.
In the earliest historical nations I need not say that the corporate
liabilities of states is to a modern student their most curious
feature. The belief is indeed raised far above the notion of mere
'luck,' because there is a distinct belief in gods or a god whom the
act offends, But the indiscriminate character of the punishment still
survives; not only the mutilator of the Hermae, but all the
Athenians--not only the violator of the rites of the Bona dea, but all
the Romans--are liable to the curse engendered; and so all through
ancient history. The strength of the corporate anxiety so created is
known to every one. Not only was it greately than any anxiety about
personal property, but it was immeasurably greater. Naturally, even
reasonably we may say, it was greater. The dread of the powers of
nature, or of the beings who rule those powers, is properly, upon
grounds of reason, as much greater than any other dread as the might of
the powers of nature is superior to that of any other powers. If a
tribe or a nation have, by a contagious fancy, come to believe that the
doing of any one thing by any number will be 'unlucky,' that is, will
bring an intense and vast liability on them all, then that tribe and
that nation will prevent the doing of that thing more than anything
else. They will deal with the most cherished chief who even by chance
should do it, as in a similar case the sailors dealt with Jonah.
I do not of course mean that this strange condition of mind as it seems
to us was the sole source of early customs. On the contrary, man might
be described as a custom-making animal with more justice than by many
of the short descriptions. In whatever way a man has done anything
once, he has a tendency to do it again: if he has done it several times
he has a great tendency so to do it, and what is more, he has a great
tendency to make others do it also. He transmits his formed customs to
his children by example and by teaching. Thi
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