hat these great writers on the law of nature and of nations say upon
this subject. BLACKSTONE has mentioned the names of them both; but he has
not thought proper to notice their arguments, much less has he attempted
to answer them. They are two of the most celebrated men that ever wrote;
and their writings are referred to as high authority, with regard to all
the subjects of which they have treated. The following is a passage from
GROTIUS, on War and Peace, Book II., chap. 2.
38. "Let us see, further, what common right there appertains to men in
those things which have already become the property of individuals. Some
persons, perchance, may consider it strange to question this, as
proprietorship seems to have absorbed all that right which arose out of a
state of things in common. But it is not so. For, it is to be considered,
_what was the intention of those who first introduced private property_,
which we may suppose to have been such, as to deviate as little as
possible from _natural equity_. For if even _written laws_ are to be
construed in that sense, as far as it is practicable, much more so are
_customs_, which are not fettered by the chains of writers.--Hence it
follows, first, that, in case of _extreme necessity_, the _pristine right
of using things revives_, as much as if they had remained in common;
because, in all human laws, as well as in the law of private property,
_this case of extreme necessity appears to have been excepted_.--So, if
the means of sustenance, as in case of a sea-voyage, should chance to
fail, that which any individual may have, should be shared in common. And
thus, a fire having broken out, I am justified in destroying the house of
my neighbour, in order to preserve my own house; and I may cut in two the
ropes or cords amongst which any ship is driven, if it cannot be otherwise
disentangled. All which exceptions are not made in the written law, but
are presumed.--For the opinion has been acknowledged amongst Divines,
that, if any one, in such case of necessity, take from another person what
is requisite for the preservation of his life, _he does not commit a
theft_. The meaning of which definition is not, as many contend, that the
proprietor of the thing be bound to give to the needy upon the principle
of _charity_; but, that all things distinctly vested in proprietors ought
to be regarded as such _with a certain benign acknowledgment of the
primitive right_. For if the original distributo
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