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se two; that the feuds and quarrels might be appeased which arose in the _primitive communion_ of things, and that men might be put under a kind of necessity of being industrious, every one being to get his maintenance by his own application and labour. This division, therefore, of goods, was not made, that every person should sit idly brooding over the share of wealth he had got, without assisting or serving his fellows; but that any one might dispose of his things how he pleased; and if he thought fit to communicate them to others, he might, at least, be thus furnished with an opportunity of laying obligations on the rest of mankind. Hence, when properties were once established, men obtained a power, not only of exercising commerce to their mutual advantage and gain, but likewise of dispensing more largely in the works of humanity and beneficence; whence their diligence had procured them a greater share of goods than others: whereas before, when all things lay in common, men could lend one another no assistance but what was supplied by their corporeal ability, and could be charitable of nothing but of their _strength_. Further, such is the force of _property_, that the _proprietor_ hath a right of delivering his goods with his own hands; even such as he is obliged to give to others. Whence it follows, that when one man has anything owing from another, he is not presently to seize on it at a venture, but ought to apply himself to the owner, desiring to receive it from his disposal. Yet in case the other party refuse thus to make good his obligation, the power and privilege of _property_ doth not reach so far as that the things may not be taken away without the owner's consent, either by the authority of the magistrate in _civil communities_, or in a _state of nature_, by violence and hostile force. And though in regard to bare Natural Right, for a man to relieve another in extremity with his goods, for which he himself hath not so much occasion, be a duty obliging only _imperfectly_, and not in the manner of a _debt_, since it arises wholly from the virtue of _humanity_; yet there seems to be no reason why, by the additional force of a civil ordinance, it may not be turned into a strict and perfect obligation. And this _Seldon_ observes to have been done among the _Jews_; who, upon a man's refusing to give such alms as were proper for him, _could force him to it by an action at law_. It is no wonder, therefore, that they
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