proceeded a
double shout--a war-cry answering to our own; and, the moment after, a
stream of dusky forms was seen pouring down each bluff, through the
sloping gorges that led to the plain.

We could hear the shout that announced the astonishment of the
Arapahoes. It betokened more than astonishment; there was terror in its
wild intonations. It was evident that they had been taken altogether by
surprise; having no suspicion that an enemy was near--least of all the
dreaded foes who were now rushing forward to surround them.

The red men are rarely betrayed into a panic. Accustomed from earliest
youth to war, with all its wiles, they are always prepared for a
_stampede_. It is the system they themselves follow, and are ever
expecting to be practised against them. They accept the chances of
attack--no matter how sudden or unforeseen--with all the coolness of a
contest premeditated and prearranged. Even terror does not always
create confusion in their ranks--for there are no ranks--and in
conflicts with their own race, combinations that result from drill and
discipline are of little consequence. It is usually a fight hand to
hand, and man to man--where individual prowess prevails, and where
superior personal strength and dexterity conduct to conquest. It is for
this reason that the scalp-trophy is so highly prized: it is a proof
that he who has taken it must have fought to obtain it. When "hair is
raised" in a night attack--by the chance of an arrow or a bullet--it is
less esteemed. By the laws of Indian warfare the stratagem of
assassination is permissible, and practised without stint. But a _coup_
of this kind is far less glorious, than to slay an enemy, in the open
field, and under the broad glare of the sunlight. In conflicts by day,
strategy is of slight advantage, and superior numbers are alone dreaded.

It was the superior numbers of their Utah enemies that caused dismay in
the ranks of the Arapahoes. Otherwise, they would not have regarded the
mode of attack--whether their assailants advanced upon them in a single
body, or in four divisions, as they were doing. Indeed it was merely
with a view of cutting off their retreat, that the Utah chieftain had
adopted the plan. Had he not taken the precaution to approach from all
sides at once, it would have been necessary for him to have waited for
the night, before an attack could have been made. In daylight it would
have been impossible to get even within