developed by study of the kind indicated.

Knowledge of the physical facts of the world mineral situation is only a
first step. Their interpretation and correlation, the study of the
underlying principles, the formulation of the necessary international
agreements and regulations, constitute even more difficult problems,
which are far from solved.

There always has been some cooperation of governments in the mineral
trade through the ordinary diplomatic channels. The question is now
prominent whether, in view of the new conditions, it may not be
necessary to develop better machinery--in the form of some international
or supernational organization, possibly patterned on war procedure--in
order to expedite the negotiations and to minimize possibilities of
friction.

During the war, when the world demand exceeded the total world supply of
certain commodities, such as nitrate and tin, international commissions
were formed in order to make an equitable distribution of these minerals
and prevent favored strong nations from taking too large a proportion of
the total. This procedure presented no insurmountable difficulties. A
canvass of the total supplies available and of the demands of the
various countries ordinarily led to voluntary compromise in the
allocation of supplies. Most of the regulations of these commissions
were applied to mineral industries which were unable to meet the total
demand. They were not tried out in cases where there were excess
supplies; this process obviously would have been much more difficult,
though perhaps not impossible.

The general success of international attempts to allocate mineral
supplies during the war suggests the lines along which results might be
accomplished during peace. The process is essentially a matter of
getting at the facts, and then discussing the situation around a
table,--thus eliminating the long delays and misunderstandings arising
from the procedure through the older established diplomatic channels.
How far such a procedure might be possible without the compelling common
interest of war is debatable.

The great powers of the Reparations Committee, previously noted, and of
the recently formed European coal commission, already indicate the
general nature of the machinery for international control which might be
exercised through a league of nations. It is not our purpose to argue
for international control or for any specific plan of control, but
rather to outline the