us in mercy and truth; keeping mercy for
thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin: and _that will
by no means clear the guilty_." Lenity which "clears the guilty" is
neither mercy, nor graciousness, nor compassion, nor forgiveness. Such
lenity obliterates moral distinctions; disintegrates society; corrupts
and weakens the moral nature of the one who indulges in it; and confirms
in perversity him on whom it is bestowed.

THE PENALTY.

+Severity and lenity alike increase the perversity of the
offender.+--Severity drives the offender into fresh determination to do
wrong; and intrenches him behind the conception that he has been treated
unfairly. He is made to think that all the world is against him, and he
sees no reason why he should not set himself against the world. Lenity
leads him to think the world is on his side no matter what he does; and
so he asks himself why he should take the trouble to mend his ways.
Lenity to others leads us to be lenient toward ourselves; and we commit
wrong in expectation of that lenient treatment which we are in the habit
of according to others. Severity to others makes us ashamed to ask for
mercy when we need it for ourselves. Furthermore, knowing there is no
mercy in ourselves, we naturally infer that there is none in others. We
disbelieve in forgiveness; and our disbelief hides from our eyes the
forgiveness, which, if we had more faith in its presence, we might
find. Hence the unforgiving man can find no forgiveness for himself in
time of need; he sinks to that level of despair and confirmed
perversity, to which his own unrelenting spirit has doomed so many of
his erring brothers.

CHAPTER XVII.

Friends.

In addition to that bond of a common humanity which ought to bind us to
all our fellow-men, there is a tie of special affinity between persons
of congenial tastes, kindred pursuits, common interests, and mutually
cherished ideals. Persons to whom we are drawn, and who are likewise
drawn to us, by these cords of subtle sympathy we call our friends.

Friendship is regard for what our friend is; not for what he can do for
us. "The perfect friendship," says Aristotle, "is that of good men who
resemble one another in virtue. For they both alike wish well to one
another as good men, and it is their essential character to be good men.
And those who wish well to their friends for the friends' sake are
friends in the truest sense; for they have these sentiments