quarter; and then the army at New York,
thus increased to nearly 40,000 men, might have had a fair chance of
overwhelming Washington by sheer weight of numbers. Such a plan might
have failed, but it is not likely that it would have led to the
surrender of the British army. And if they could have disposed of
Washington, the British might have succeeded. It was more necessary for
them to get rid of him than to march up and down the valley of the
Hudson. But it was not strange that they did not see this as we do. It
is always easy enough to be wise after things have happened.

Even as it was, if their plan had really been followed, they might have
succeeded. If Howe's army had gone up to meet Burgoyne, the history of
the year 1777 would have been very different from what it was. We shall
presently see why it did not do so. Let us now recount the fortunes of
Burgoyne and St. Leger.

[Sidenote: Burgoyne takes Ticonderoga, July 5, 1777.]

Burgoyne came up Lake Champlain in June, and easily won Ticonderoga,
because the Americans had failed to secure a neighbouring position which
commanded the fortress. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga from Mount Defiance,
just as the Americans would have taken Boston from Bunker Hill, if they
had been able to stay there, just as they afterward did take it from
Dorchester Heights, and just as Howe took New York after he had won
Brooklyn Heights. When you have secured a position from which you can
kill the enemy twice as fast as he can kill you, he must of course
retire from the situation; and the sooner he goes, the better chance he
has of living to fight another day. The same principle worked in all
these cases, and it worked with General Howe at Harlem Heights and at
White Plains.

[Sidenote: Schuyler and Gates.]

When it was known that Burgoyne had taken Ticonderoga, there was
dreadful dismay in America and keen disappointment among those Whigs in
England whose declared sympathies were with us. George III. was beside
himself with glee, and thought that the Americans were finally defeated
and disposed of. But they were all mistaken. The garrison of Ticonderoga
had taken the alarm and retreated, so that Burgoyne captured only an
empty fortress. He left 1000 men in charge of it, and then pressed on
into the wilderness between Lake Champlain and the upper waters of the
Hudson river. His real danger was now beginning to show itself, and
every day it could be seen more distinctly. He was pl