he whole they bore a very
different relation to the laws of the land from the by-laws of modern
corporations, the latter being purely subsidiary, while the former
affected the most important issues, and, in the absence of much general
legislation, possessed all the validity of statute law.

CUSTOM IN LAW

As there was considerable variation between the customs of different
towns and different counties, it became the duty of the Justices on Eyre
to investigate what was the custom, with regard to the subject of the
plea, in the particular locality, and they gave their decisions
accordingly.

Some of these cases are sufficiently amusing, as may be gathered from
the following record of a case heard in the Salop Inter of 1292:

"One Adam brought a writ of Entry against B.--B.: 'Sir, we vouch to
warranty, &c, W. de C., who is under age, to be summoned, &c.'--C. came
and prayed his age.--_Spigornel_ (for Adam): 'Sir, according to the
custom of the town, he is of age when he knows how to count up to twelve
pence, and he shall answer in a writ of Right at that age; and inasmuch
as he would answer in a writ of Right at that age, he shall warrant at
that age, or shall counterplead, &c. But now he is nineteen years old,
which is nearly of full age. Judgment if he shall not warrant or
counterplead.' Judgment that he should."

From the same Year-Book we obtain an insight into the working of what
may be termed communal law in the weighty matter of succession. One
Isabel brought the Novel Disseisin against a chaplain named Martin de
Hereford and others for a tenement in Shrewsbury. The defence was that
Martin had entered by the devise of one William Silke, and that the
custom of the town permitted a man on his death-bed to devise tenements
of his own purchase. Isabel's counsel, on the other hand, contended that
William's father held the tenements by the law of England, and that
William merely purchased the freehold, arguing also that the devise was
made in contravention of the statute (7 Ed. I., st. 27), since it was
made in mortmain for the beneficiaries to chant for him and his heirs
for ever. The Judge ruled that alienation contrary to the statute was no
justification for the heir to enter; and he drew attention to the
inconsistency of counsel in pleading that Silke could not devise his
inheritance, and that he could devise if there were no infraction of the
statute. Counsel thereupon elected to abide by his first contention,