a large part of the way, in front of
their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all
the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to
Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his
way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of
Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would
not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to
us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery
still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that
army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The
railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the
government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the
south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and
Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river
and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the
Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between
these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the
position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a
circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country,
increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten
thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw
a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.
The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time,
with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the
country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the
cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the
condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." Indeed,
the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with
a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard
bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without
sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.
What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was
exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it
from the opposite bank, where it was abunda