march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The
remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from
Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and
leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only
reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest
day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think
you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of the
enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they
should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has
ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will
ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out
of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be
spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from
here?"
Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.
That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable
he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position
threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought
back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,
Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that
evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.
My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival
(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be
engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no
special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's
corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on
the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the
remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards
appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower
palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.
The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,
form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so
as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him
either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his
base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our
right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanoog
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