.
"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be
your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your
force and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide. This indicates
the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River
as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments
in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of
transports the two armies would become a unit.
"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your
direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry
south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time
of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.
"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable
day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the
execution of this order.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."
On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the
19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of
General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort
Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact
time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would
not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight
Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he,
however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction
with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be
certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to
have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the
junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable
anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up
the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after
the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he
should at least detain as large a force there as possible.
In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was
desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments
remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in
the background for the protection of our extended lines between the
loyal States and the armies operating against them.
A very considerable force, under com
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