ay be
mentioned that by some misapprehension on the part of the public,
this estimate of the duration of a machine was thought to cover also
the average life of the aviators in service. Happily this was far
from true. The mortality among the machines was not altogether due
to wounds sustained in combat, but largely to general wear and tear,
rough usage, and constant service. The slightest sign of weakness in
a machine led to its instant condemnation and destruction, for if it
should develop in mid-air into a serious fault it might cost the
life of the aviator and even a serious disaster to the army which he
was serving. As the war went on the period of service of a machine
became even briefer, for with the growing demand for faster and more
quickly controllable machines everything was sacrificed to lightness
and speed. The factor of safety which early in the war was six to
eight was reduced to three and a half, and instances were known in
all services of machines simply collapsing and going to pieces under
their own weight without wound or shock.

About the extent to which the belligerent governments developed
their air forces after the outbreak of war there was during the
continuance of that conflict great reticence maintained by all of
them. At the outset there was little employment of the flyers except
on scouting reconnaissance work, or in directing artillery fire. The
raids of Zeppelins upon England, of seaplanes on Kiel and Cuxhaven,
of airplanes on Friedrichshaven, Essen, and Venice came later. It
has been noted by military authorities that, while Germany was
provided at first with the largest aviation force of all the
belligerents, she either underestimated its value at the outset, or
did not know how to employ it, for she blundered into and through
Belgium using her traditional Uhlans for scouts, to the virtual
exclusion of airmen. The effectiveness of the Belgian fight for
delay is ascribed largely to the intelligent and effective use its
strategists made of the few aircraft they possessed.

Wellington was wont to say that the thing he yearned for most in
battle was to "see the other side of that hill."

Napoleon wrote:

Nothing is more contradictory, nothing more bewildering than the
multitude of reports of spies, or of officers sent out to
reconnoitre. Some locate army corps where they have seen only
detachments; others see only detachments where they ought to have
seen army co