ged Congress during its first
session was the establishment of executive departments, the heads of
which should be the counsellors and assistants of the president in the
management of public affairs. Hitherto these functions had been
performed by those officers who had been appointed, some of them several
years before, by Congress under the old Confederation. John Jay had been
secretary for foreign affairs (an equivalent to secretary of state)
since 1784; General Knox had been at the head of the war department
since the close of 1783, when he succeeded General Lincoln; and the
treasury department was still managed by a board, at that time
consisting of Samuel Osgood, Walter Livingston, and Arthur Lee.

Congress established three executive departments--treasury, war, and
foreign affairs (the latter afterward called department of state)--the
heads of which were to be styled secretaries, instead of ministers as in
Europe, and were to constitute, with the president of the United States,
an executive council. In the organization of these departments, the
important question arose, in what manner might the high officers who
should fill them be appointed or removed? Many believed that the
decision of this question would materially influence the character of
the new government; and the clause in the act to "establish an executive
department to be denominated the department of foreign affairs," which
declared the secretary thereof to be removable by the president, was
debated with great warmth. It was contended that such a prerogative
given to the president was in its character so monarchical that it
would, in the nature of things, convert the heads of departments into
mere tools and creatures of his will; that a dependence so servile on
one individual would deter men of high and honorable minds from engaging
in the public service; and that the most alarming dangers to liberty
might be perceived in such prerogative. It was feared, they said, that
those who advocated the bestowment of such power upon the president were
too much dazzled with the splendor of the virtues which adorned the then
incumbent of the office; and that they did not extend their views far
enough to perceive, that an ambitious man at the head of the government
might apply the prerogative to dangerous purposes, and remove the best
of men from office.

The idea that a man could ever be elected by the people of the United
States to the office of chief magistrate,