ad
lost on Mary's accession. Probably the queen had more to do with the
falsification of this rumour than Cecil, though he is said to have opposed
in the parliament of 1555--in which he represented Lincolnshire--a bill for
the confiscation of the estates of the Protestant refugees. But the story,
even as told by his biographer (Peck, _Desiderata Curiosa_, i. 11), does
not represent Cecil's conduct as having been very courageous; and it is
more to his credit that he found no seat in the parliament of 1558, for
which Mary had directed the return of "discreet and good Catholic members."

By that time Cecil had begun to trim his sails to a different breeze. He
was in secret communication with Elizabeth before Mary died, and from the
first the new queen relied on Cecil as she relied on no one else. Her
confidence was not misplaced; Cecil was exactly the kind of minister
England then required. Personal experience had ripened his rare natural
gift for avoiding dangers. It was no time for brilliant initiative or
adventurous politics; the need was to avoid Scylla and Charybdis, and a
_via media_ had to be found in church and state, at home and abroad. Cecil
was not a political genius; no great ideas emanated from his brain. But he
was eminently a safe man, not an original thinker, but a counsellor of
unrivalled wisdom. Caution was his supreme characteristic; he saw that
above all things England required time. Like Fabius, he restored the
fortunes of his country by deliberation. He averted open rupture until
England was strong enough to stand the shock. There was nothing heroic
about Cecil or his policy; it involved a callous attitude towards
struggling Protestants abroad. Huguenots and Dutch Were aided just enough
to keep them going in the struggles which warded danger off from England's
shores. But Cecil never developed that passionate aversion from decided
measures which became a second nature to his mistress. His intervention in
Scotland in 1559-1560 showed that he could strike on occasion; and his
action over the execution of Mary, queen of Scots, proved that he was
willing to take responsibility from which Elizabeth shrank. Generally he
was in favour of more decided intervention on behalf of continental
Protestants than Elizabeth would admit, but it is not always easy to
ascertain the advice he gave. He has left endless memoranda lucidly setting
forth the pros and cons of every course of action; but there are few
indications