re striking and obvious. The benefit which must have resulted
to England, both by accession of strength and security, was riot
despicable; and as the English were by far the greater nation, and
possessed the seat of government, the objections, either from the point
of honor or from jealousy, could not reasonably have any place among
them. The English parliament, indeed, seem to have been swayed merely
by the vulgar motive of national antipathy. And they persisted so
obstinately in their prejudices, that all the efforts for a thorough
union and incorporation ended only in the abolition of the hostile laws
formerly enacted between the kingdoms.[*]

* The commons were even so averse to the union, that they
had complained in the former session, to the lords, of the
bishop of Bristol, for writing a book in favor of it; and
the prelate was obliged to make submissions for this
offence. The crime imputed to him seems to have consisted in
his treating of a subject which lay before the parliament:
so little notion had they as yet of general liberty. See
Parliamentary History, vol. v. p 108, 109, 110

Some precipitate steps, which the king, a little after his accession,
had taken, in order to promote his favorite project, had been here
observed to do more injury than service. From his own authority, he had
assumed the title of king of Great Britain; and had quartered the arms
of Scotland with those of England, in all coins, flags, and ensigns. He
had also engaged the judges to make a declaration, that all those who,
after the union of the crowns, should be born in either kingdom, were,
for that reason alone, naturalized in both. This was a nice question,
and, according to the ideas of those times, susceptible of subtle
reasoning on both sides. The king was the same: the parliaments were
different. To render the people therefore the same, we must suppose that
the sovereign authority resided chiefly in the prince, and that these
popular assemblies were rather instituted to assist with money and
advice, than endowed with any controlling or active powers in the
government. "It is evident," says Bacon, in his pleadings on this
subject, "that all other commonwealths, monarchies only excepted, do
subsist by a law precedent. For where authority is divided amongst many
officers, and they not perpetual, but annual or temporary, and not to
receive their authority but by election, and certain persons t