eed is endowed with that capacity,
but by the twist given to these lower parts, he turns it contrariwise,
and thereby his reason becomes unsound.

24. Every man, even if unconsciously, thinks of a body of men as of one
man; therefore he instantly perceives what is meant when it is said that
a king is the head, and the subjects are the body, also that this or
that person has such a place in the general body, that is, in the kingdom.
As it is with the body politic, so is it with the body spiritual. The
body spiritual is the church; its head is God-Man; and from this it is
plain how the church thus viewed as a man would appear if instead of one
God, the Creator and Sustainer of the universe, several were thought of.
The church thus viewed would appear as one body with several heads; thus
not as a man, but as a monster. If it be said that these heads have one
essence, and that thus together they make one head, the only conception
possible is either that of one head with several faces or of several
heads with one face; thus making the church, viewed as a whole, appear
deformed. But in truth, the one God is the head, and the church is the
body, which acts under the command of the head, and not from itself; as
is also the case in man; and from this it is that there can be only one
king in a kingdom, for several kings would rend it asunder, but one is
able to preserve its unity.

25. So would it be with the church scattered throughout the whole globe,
which is called a communion, because it is as one body under one head.
It is known that the head rules the body under it at will; for
understanding and will have their seat in the head; and in conformity
to the understanding and will the body is directed, even to the extent
that the body is nothing but obedience. As the body can do nothing except
from the understanding and will in the head, so the man of the church can
do nothing except from God. The body seems to act of itself, as if the
hands and feet in acting are moved of themselves; or the mouth and tongue
in speaking vibrate of themselves, when, in fact, they do not in the
slightest degree act of themselves, but only from an affection of the
will and the consequent thought of the understanding in the head.
Suppose, now, one body to have several heads and each head to be free
to act from its own understanding and its own will, could such a body
continue to exist? For among several heads singleness of purpose, such
as results