e
complimentary terms in which said Republic has referred to the first
centennial of our national independence.

Sympathizing, as I do, in the spirit of courtesy and friendly
recognition which has prompted the passage of these resolutions, I can
not escape the conviction that their adoption has inadvertently involved
the exercise of a power which infringes upon the constitutional rights
of the Executive.

The usage of governments generally confines their correspondence
and interchange of opinion and of sentiments of congratulation, as
well as of discussion, to one certain established agency. To allow
correspondence or interchange between states to be conducted by or with
more than one such agency would necessarily lead to confusion, and
possibly to contradictory presentation of views and to international
complications.

The Constitution of the United States, following the established usage
of nations, has indicated the President as the agent to represent the
national sovereignty in its intercourse with foreign powers and to
receive all official communications from them. It gives him the power,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties and
to appoint embassadors and other public ministers; it intrusts to him
solely "to receive embassadors and other public ministers," thus vesting
in him the origination of negotiations and the reception and conduct of
all correspondence with foreign states, making him, in the language of
one of the most eminent writers on constitutional law, "the
constitutional organ of communication with foreign states."

No copy of the addresses which it is proposed to acknowledge is
furnished. I have no knowledge of their tone, language, or purport. From
the tenor of the two joint resolutions it is to be inferred that these
communications are probably purely congratulatory. Friendly and kindly
intentioned as they may be, the presentation by a foreign state of any
communication to a branch of the Government not contemplated by the
Constitution for the reception of communications from foreign states
might, if allowed to pass without notice, become a precedent for the
address by foreigners or by foreign states of communications of a
different nature and with wicked designs.

If Congress can direct the correspondence of the Secretary of State
with foreign governments, a case very different from that now under
consideration might arise, when that officer might be directed to