the enemy over the edge of the mountains, with the
plain beneath in full view. Further defence would then become extremely
difficult and costly, and the whole situation, as regards relative
superiority of positions and observation, now so greatly in our favour,
would be more than reversed. We were too near the edge to have any elbow
room or freedom of manoeuvre. Our present positions were almost the last
that we could hope to hold without very grave embarrassment. It would
have seemed evident, then, that to obtain more elbow room and security,
we should not be content with a defensive policy, but should aim at
gaining ground and thickening the mountain wall by means of an early
local offensive, even if larger operations were not yet practicable.

But, from the offensive point of view, our position presented great
difficulties. To make only a small advance would leave us worse off
than now. Merely to go out into the middle of the Plateau, merely to
reoccupy the ruins of Asiago, would be futile, except for a very slight
and transitory "moral effect." To carry the whole Plateau and establish
a line along the lower slopes of the northern ridge would be no better.
We should only be taking over the difficulties of the enemy in respect
of his exposed positions, while he would escape from these difficulties
and obtain an immunity from observation nearly as great as that which we
now possessed. No offensive would benefit us which did not give us, at
the very least, the whole of the crest of the northern ridge. And to aim
at this would be a big and risky undertaking, involving perhaps heavy
casualties and large reserves. We had only three British Divisions in
Italy at this time, the 7th, 23rd and 48th, two of which were always in
the line and one in reserve. The French had now only two Divisions in
Italy and the Italians, when the German advance in France became
serious, had sent to France more men than there were French and British
left in Italy. The large fact remained that, since the military collapse
of Russia the previous year, the Austrians had brought practically their
whole Army on to the Italian Front and established a large superiority
over the Italians, both in numbers and in guns. Considerable Italian
reserves had to be kept mobile and ready to meet an Austrian offensive
anywhere along the mountain front or on the plain. There was not likely
to be much that could be safely spared to back up a Franco-British
offensive o