n
these raids, and the great quantity of ammunition shot away, were
largely wasted. We saw no sufficient return for them, beyond a certain
amount of information obtained from prisoners, much of which was of
small and doubtful value. But in view of what happened later, I think it
must be agreed that these continual raids and bombardments did their
share in gradually wearing down the morale and power of resistance of
the Austrian Army.

There was a persistent rumour that the enemy was on the point of
retiring to a line, on which he was known to be working hard, along the
lower slopes of Monte Interrotto and Monte Catz on the far side of the
Plateau. This line, we learned from prisoners, was commonly referred to
as the _Winterstellung_ (winter position). It would have been stronger,
defensively, than his existing line, and would have had the great
advantage of being able largely to be supplied and munitioned during
daylight, as there was much good cover and roads hidden in the pine
woods leading down immediately behind it. It would have involved the
moral disadvantage of evacuating the ruins of Asiago. But, with the snow
down on the Plateau, every Austrian track and foot-mark would have been
visible from our O.P.'s, and the Austrian situation, bad as it already
was from this point of view, would have become quite intolerable. If, on
the other hand, we had followed up an Austrian retreat to their
_Winterstellung_ by the occupation of Asiago and the throwing forward of
our line across the Plateau, the relative situation would have been
reversed. Our Infantry and many of our Batteries would then be out in
the open, in view from the Austrian O.P.'s, unable to light a fire by
day, and only able to send up supplies by night; and our general
situation would be so much the worse with heavy snow increasing our
discomfort and the visibility of any work we might undertake and of our
every movement.

For this reason, as has been explained in an earlier chapter, it was
taken for granted that a small advance from our present excellent line
would be worse than useless, and that only an advance at least to the
crest of the first mountain range beyond the Plateau would be of any
military value. The possibility of such an advance being attempted was
evidently still in the minds of the Staff, for our forward or Battle
Position at San Sisto had to be kept in constant readiness for
occupation, and it was suggested by some that the occasion f