Those who know
the Italian soldier know that no soldier in the world responds more
readily to loyal trust, to common kindliness and to efficient and
inspiring leadership. British and French officers, who have had
opportunities of judging, know this as well as Italians. But the Italian
High Command denied these things to the Italian soldier.[1] It is due to
him and to the good name of Italy, which has been damnably traduced by
prejudiced and ignorant men, that the truth should be spoken.
[Footnote 1: Among other charges which may be brought against the High
Command at this time are, first, their failure to make adequate
provision for the amusement and relaxation of the troops when in rest,
such as the Y.M.C.A. and various concert parties provided for British
troops, to combat inevitable war-weariness; second, failure to increase
the most inadequate scale of rations; and, third, the attempt to apply,
with strange disregard of the very different spirit of the Italian
people, some of the worst and most brutal traditions of German
discipline. All this was altered later by General Diaz and the Orlando
Ministry.]
The dark and tragic story of the Italian retreat is lit up by many deeds
of heroism, wherein the Italian soldier showed all his accustomed
valour. And it was only by the valour of the Italian soldier that the
retreat was stayed on the Piave line, which the High Command pronounced
to be untenable and wished to abandon, but which the Cabinet at Rome,
pinning their faith to the qualities of the Italian soldier rather than
to the opinions of the High Command, ordered to be held at all hazards.
And the Cabinet at Rome was right. The Italian line stiffened and stood
upon the Piave, while the Allied reinforcements were still on the
further side of the Alps. If only Lloyd George and Bissolati had had
their way, and these reinforcements had been sent a few months earlier,
if only we had been able to put a British Army Corps, with its full
complement of aircraft, guns and shells, against the Hermada, if only we
had had half a dozen tanks to send down the Vippacco Valley, what a
different story there would have been to tell!
* * * * *
We ourselves were out of the first stages of that great defence. We had
no ammunition, and we were terribly short of gun stores, though the bare
guns had all been saved. And our men were very short of steel helmets
and box respirators, and the boots and clothi
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