experience: it
being a certain, necessary truth that the nearer the direct rays falling
on the eye approach to a PARALLELISM, the farther off is the point of
their intersection, or the visible point from whence they flow.
8. I have here set down the common, current accounts that are given of
our perceiving near distances by sight, which, though they are
unquestionably received for true by MATHEMATICIANS, and accordingly made
use of by them in determining the apparent places of OBJECTS, do,
nevertheless seem to me very unsatisfactory: and that for these following
reasons:--
9. FIRST, It is evident that when the mind perceives any IDEA, not
immediately and of itself, it must be by the means of some other IDEA.
Thus, for instance, the passions which are in the mind of another are of
themselves to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them by sight,
though not immediately, yet by means of the colours they produce in the
countenance. We often see shame or fear in the looks of a man, by
perceiving the changes of his countenance to red or pale.
10. Moreover it is evident that no IDEA which is not itself perceived can
be the means of perceiving any other IDEA. If I do not perceive the
redness or paleness of a man's face themselves, it is impossible I should
perceive by them the passions which are in his mind.
11. Now from sect. 2 it is plain that distance is in its own nature
imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by sight. It remains, therefore,
that it be brought into view by means of some other IDEA that is itself
immediately perceived in the act of VISION.
12. But those LINES and ANGLES, by means whereof some MATHEMATICIANS
pretend to explain the perception of distance, are themselves not at all
perceived, nor are they in truth ever thought of by those unskilful in
optics. I appeal to anyone's experience whether upon sight of an OBJECT he
computes its distance by the bigness of the ANGLE made by the meeting of
the two OPTIC AXES? Or whether he ever thinks of the greater or lesser
divergency of the rays, which arrive from any point to his PUPIL? Everyone
is himself the best judge of what he perceives, and what not. In vain
shall all the MATHEMATICIANS in the world tell me, that I perceive certain
LINES and ANGLES which introduce into my mind the various IDEAS of
DISTANCE, so long as I myself am conscious of no such thing.
13. Since, therefore, those ANGLES and LINES are not themselves perceived
by sight, it
|