for that from want of
a right understanding thereof the difficulty of explaining erect vision
seems chiefly to arise.
92. In order to disentangle our minds from whatever prejudices we may
entertain with relation to the subject in hand, nothing seems more
apposite than the taking into our thoughts the case of one born blind,
and afterwards, when grown up, made to see. And though, perhaps, it may
not be an easy task to divest ourselves entirely of the experience
received from sight, so as to be able to put our thoughts exactly in the
posture of such a one's, we must, nevertheless, as far as possible,
endeavour to frame true conceptions of what might reasonably be supposed
to pass in his mind.
93. It is certain that a man actually blind, and who had continued so
from his birth, would by the sense of feeling attain to have ideas of
upper and lower. By the motion of his hand he might discern the situation
of any tangible object placed within his FI reach. That part on which he
felt himself supported, or towards which he perceived his body to
gravitate, he would term lower, and the contrary to this upper; and
accordingly denominate whatsoever objects he touched.
94. But then, whatever judgments he makes concerning the situation of
objects are confined to those only that are perceivable by touch. All
those things that are intangible and of a spiritual nature, his thoughts
and desires, his passions, and in general all the modifications of the
soul, to these he would never apply the terms UPPER and LOWER, except
only in a metaphorical sense. He may, perhaps, by way of allusion, speak
of high or low thoughts: but those terms in their proper signification
would never be applied to anything that was not conceived to exist
without the mind. For a man born blind, and remaining in the same state,
could mean nothing else by the words HIGHER and LOWER than a greater or
lesser distance from the earth; which distance he would measure by the
motion or application of his hand or some other part of his body. It is
therefore evident that all those things which, in respect of each other,
would by him be thought higher or lower, must be such as were conceived
to exist without his mind, in the ambient space.
95. Whence it plainly follows that such a one, if we suppose him made to
see, would not at first sight think anything he saw was high or low,
erect or inverted; for it hath been already demonstrated in sect. 41 that
he would not thi
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