itude of objects as we do now: which hath
been shown to be a false and groundless persuasion. And for the like
reasons the same censure may be passed on the positive assurance that
most men, before they have thought sufficiently of the matter, might have
of their being able to determine by the eye at first view, whether
objects were erect or inverse.

101. It will, perhaps, be objected co our opinion that a man, for
instance, being thought erect when his feet are next the earth, and
inverted when his head is next the earth, it doth hence follow that by
the mere act of vision, without any experience or altering the situation
of the eye, we should have determined whether he were erect or inverted:
for both the earth itself, and the limbs of the man who stands thereon,
being equally perceived by sight, one cannot choose seeing what part of
the man is nearest the earth, and what part farthest from it, i.e.
whether he be erect or inverted.

102. To which I answer, the ideas which constitute the tangible earth and
man are entirely different from those which constitute the visible earth
and man. Nor was it possible, by virtue of the visive faculty alone,
without superadding any experience of touch, or altering the position of
the eye, ever to have known, or so much as suspected, there had been any
relation or connexion between them. Hence a man at first view would not
denominate anything he saw earth, or head, or foot; and consequently he
could not tell by the mere act of vision whether the head or feet were
nearest the earth: nor, indeed, would we have thereby any thought of
earth or man, erect or inverse, at all: which will be made yet more
evident if we nicely observe, and make a particular comparison between,
the ideas of both senses.

103. That which I see is only variety of light and colours. That which I
feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What similitude, what
connexion have those ideas with these? Or how is it possible that anyone
should see reason to give one and the same name to combinations of ideas
so very different before he had experienced their coexistence? We do not
find there is any necessary connexion betwixt this or that tangible
quality and any colour whatsoever. And we may sometimes perceive colours
where there is nothing to be felt. All which doth make it manifest that
no man, at first receiving of his sight, would know there was any
agreement between this or that particular object of h