he
treaty; he kept, however, a copy of the draft in Benedetti's
handwriting, and published it in _The Times_ in the summer of 1870 so as
to injure the credit of Napoleon in England. The failure of the scheme
made a contest with France inevitable, at least unless the Germans were
willing to forgo the purpose of completing the work of German unity, and
during the next four years the two nations were each preparing for the
struggle, and each watching to take the other at a disadvantage.

The Ems telegram.

It is necessary, then, to keep in mind the general situation in
considering Bismarck's conduct in the months immediately preceding the
war of 1870. In 1867 there was a dispute regarding the right to garrison
Luxemburg. Bismarck then produced the secret treaties with the southern
states, an act which was, as it were, a challenge to France by the whole
of Germany. During the next three years the Ultramontane party hoped to
bring about an anti-Prussian revolution, and Napoleon was working for an
alliance with Austria, where Beust, an old opponent of Bismarck's, was
chancellor. Bismarck was doubtless well informed as to the progress of
the negotiations, for he had established intimate relations with the
Hungarians. The pressure at home for completing the work of German unity
was so strong that he could with difficulty resist it, and in 1870 he
was much embarrassed by a request from Baden to be admitted to the
confederation, which he had to refuse. It is therefore not surprising
that he eagerly welcomed the opportunity of gaining the goodwill of
Spain, and supported by all the means in his power the offer made by
Marshal Prim that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern should be chosen king
of that country. It was only by his urgent and repeated representations
that the prince was persuaded against his will to accept. The
negotiations were carried out with the greatest secrecy, but as soon as
the acceptance was made known the French government intervened and
declared that the project was inadmissable. Bismarck was away at Varzin,
but on his instructions the Prussian foreign office in answer to
inquiries denied all knowledge or responsibility. This was necessary,
because it would have caused a bad impression in Germany had he gone to
war with France in support of the prince's candidature. The king, by
receiving Benedetti at Ems, departed from the policy of reserve Bismarck
himself adopted, and Bismarck (who had now gone to Berlin