conform to the counsels of
others. He does not yield to the clamors of discontented
subjects, or make concessions to contemporary and independent
powers. The words are thus paraphrased by McKnight, a Calvinistic
commentator: "According to the gracious purpose of him, who
effectually accomplisheth all his benevolent intentions, by the
most proper means, according to the wise determination of his own
will." We may, with as much propriety, argue from the apostolic
injunction, "Do all things without murmurings and disputings"
(Phil. ii. 14), that Christians are required by the law of God to
_do all things_ absolutely, as, from the clause under consideration,
that God has decreed and executes whatsoever comes to pass. But, if
our brethren insist upon so understanding the apostle, we shall
hold them to their interpretation. We shall not allow them to
contradict it whenever the exigencies of the argument may render it
convenient.

1. In the first place, this theory of predestination is
inconsistent with the doctrine of man's free moral agency. The
force of this objection is readily perceived. It is _impossible_
that we should be free agents, when all the _external circumstances_
that affect us, and all our _mental_ and _bodily acts_, are
predetermined and brought about by God. Man is thus reduced to, a
mere passive instrument. He is nothing more than a complicate and
curious machine--a man-machine, an automaton--whose every movement
is conceived, determined, directed, controlled by a supervisor. It
avails nothing to apply to him terms which signify freedom. We may
say that he has _the power to will_; that he _actually wills_; but
the difficulty is not relieved. The being who endowed him with this
faculty has foreordained and brings to pass, by a well-directed
agency, every movement of that faculty. We may say that he _wills
according to his inclinations_, and is therefore free; but God has
decreed and brings to pass all his inclinations. We may say that he
acts according to his will, and not against his will; still nothing
is gained, since all his purposes, and the movements by which he
executes them, are equally preordained and brought to pass by
God. We may say that he is _conscious_ of _acting freely_, but
this is a mere delusion, if the doctrine we are considering be
true. By the very logic which reconciles it with free agency in
man, I will undertake to prove that every steamboat and every
railroad-engine is a free age