nge the State constitutions in favor of equal
rights. And, within five or six years of the present time, a
Presbyterian Church, in one of the States of this Republic,
applied to the legislature, and obtained a grant of one thousand
five hundred dollars to be expended upon a Presbyterian church
edifice. Many Calvinists have held, and many do yet hold
doctrines highly intolerant; and the history of Calvinism is
crimsoned by records of blood spilled in support of its tenets.
It would be great wisdom on the part of our Calvinistic brethren
to allow the question of the bearing of Calvinism upon civil and
religious liberty to sleep, undisturbed.

A very strong presumption of the unsoundness of the Calvinistic
doctrine of decrees arises from the fact that its advocates are
compelled, in answering objections to it, not only to disguise,
but also flatly contradict it, and to substitute for it Arminian
positions; thus virtually conceding that it is indefensible. Dr.
Musgrave, as we have seen, asserts explicitly that God has
foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. He argues that to deny
this, would be in effect to deny that God is infinitely wise,
benevolent, and powerful. He says: "We have proved, both by
reason and revelation, that all things that come to pass are
foreordained." He applies this doctrine to sinful actions in the
following manner: "Now, that the whole of Pharaoh's conduct had
not only been foreknown but foreordained is indisputable." Again,
he says: "In connection with the foregoing statements concerning
the crucifixion of the Saviour, let us single out the case of one
of the individual actors in that awful tragedy, one whose part
was the most perfidious and execrable, and see whether his crime
was not before ordained, and he the individual predesignated as
its perpetrator." He proceeds to the proof of this proposition.
But, when it becomes necessary to meet the palpable and
irrefutable objections that this doctrine makes God the author of
sin, and takes away the responsibility of the creature, he is
compelled to change entirely his ground. He substitutes
_permission_ for _foreordination_, and defines permission to mean
simply not preventing. "And is there no difference," says he,
"between God's making, or exciting men to sin, by his power or
influence, and his _permitting_, or _not preventing_ them from
sinning? Between his determining to produce the evil himself, or
to cause others by his power to do it, and h