oposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to
our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of the state of war
which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events."

Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Mensdorff in London to explain to
Sir Edward Grey in detail the _dossier_ of charges against Serbia
accompanying the Austrian note, and

"make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our
note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without
giving any guaranty for the future.

"As the Serbian Government knew that only an unconditional
acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Serbian tactics
can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our
demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress
public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required
to fulfill her promises. In conversing with Sir Edward Grey, your
excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that
the general mobilization of the Serbian army was ordered for the
afternoon of July 25 at three o'clock, while the answer to our
note was delivered just before the expiration of the time
fixed--that is to say, a few minutes before six o'clock. Up to
then we had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian
mobilization we were compelled to do so."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szapary, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, an account of an interview with the Russian Ambassador at
Vienna. Count Berchtold had informed M. Schebeko of Austria-Hungary's
inability to concur in Russia's proposal to take the Serbian reply to
the Austrian note as a starting point for an understanding between the
disputants.

"No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve
negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer
which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more
impossible because, as the ambassador knew, there was a deep
feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public
opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared
against Serbia.

"In reply to the explanations of the ambassador, which culminated
in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted
hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the
contrary, we should only increase it, I gave him some insi