to the whole human race, and all the pity that they have
accumulated, and, as it were, capitalised in institutions political,
social and ecclesiastical, through countless generations" (pp. 68-9).
He, then, who would not "shock modern views of the Universe" (p. 157)
must thus think of the Deity. And so Atheism acquires a new meaning. "It
is," we read, "a disbelief in the _existence_ of God--that is, a
disbelief in _any_ regularity in the Universe to which a man must
conform himself under penalties" (p. 27); a definition which surely is a
little hard upon the _libres-penseurs_, as taking the bread out of their
mouths. I remember hearing, not long ago, in Paris, of a young Radical
diplomatist who, with the good taste which characterizes the school now
dominant in French politics, took occasion to mention to a well-known
ecclesiastical statesman that he was an Atheist. "O de l'atheisme a
votre age," said the Nuncio, with a benign smile: "pourquoi, quand
l'impiete suffit et ne vous engage a rien?" But with the new
signification imposed upon the word, a profession of Atheism would
pledge one in quite another sense: it would be equivalent to a
profession of insanity; for where, except among the wearers of
strait-waistcoats or the occupants of padded rooms, shall we find a man
who does not believe in some regularity in the universe to which he must
conform himself under penalties? But let us follow the author of
"Natural Religion" a step further in his inquiry. "In what relation does
this religion stand to our Christianity, to our churches, and religious
denominations?" (p. 139). Certainly, we may safely agree with him that
"it has a difficulty in identifying itself with any of the organized
systems," and as safely that the "conception of a spiritual city," of an
"organ of civilization," of an "interpreter of human society," is
"precisely what is now needed" (p. 223). "The tide of thought,
scepticism, and discovery, which has set in ... must be warded off the
institutions which it attacks as recklessly as if its own existence did
not depend upon them. It introduces everywhere a sceptical condition of
mind, which it recommends as the only way to real knowledge; and yet if
such scepticism became practical, if large communities came to regard
every question in politics and law as absolutely open, their
institutions would dissolve, and science, among other things, would be
buried in the ruin. Modern thought brings into vogue a spe
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