and to accomplish this object, the Sultan did not hesitate to
ignore all Mohammedan ideas of propriety. His demonstrations of
friendship for Germany is another illustration of his diplomatic skill.
But while ready to yield any point of etiquette to accomplish his ends,
he has resisted to the last every attempt to induce him to do anything
to repress or punish any development of Moslem fanaticism. All Europe
combined could not force him to punish the murderer of Colonel
Coumaroff, the secretary of the Russian Embassy, who was shot down in
the street like a dog by a servant of the Palace; nor, so far as I know,
has he ever suffered a Moslem to be punished for murdering a Christian.

His agents have done their best to rouse the Mohammedans of India and
Central Asia. He has armed the tribes of Northern Africa against France,
and encouraged them to resist to the end. He has given new life to
Mohammedan fanaticism in Turkey. The change from the days of Abd-ul-Aziz
is very marked. The counsellors of the Sultan are no longer the
Ministers, but the astrologers, eunuchs, and holy men of the Palace. No
Mussulman could now change his faith in Constantinople without losing
his life. Firmans can no longer be obtained for Christian churches, and
it is extremely difficult to obtain permission to print a Christian
book, even in a Christian language. The greatest care is taken to seize
books of every description in the Custom House. It is not long since the
Life of Mr. Gladstone was seized as a forbidden book. It is a curious
fact in this connection that the fanaticism of the Government is far in
advance of the fanaticism of the people. There is no fear of the people,
except as they are encouraged and pushed forward by those in authority.
If left to themselves, Turks and Christians would have no difficulty in
living together amicably.

The relation of the Sultan to the rebellion in Egypt is not perfectly
clear, and probably never will be. In one sense he was no doubt the
cause of it. It was a direct result of the agitation which his policy
had roused. But it was not intended by Arabi to strengthen the power of
a Turkish Caliph. It was originally anti-Turkish, and looked to the
revival of the Arab Caliphate, as well as to the personal advantage of
Arabi himself. The Sultan could not oppose it without exciting the
enmity of those whom he most wished to conciliate, so he sought to
control it and turn it to his own advantage. He gave Arabi a