e offensive, and in the two instances where he did assume the
offensive his campaigns were failures; and can any one doubt that if
General Grant had been in command either at Antietam or Gettysburg, the
war would than have come to an end of the left bank of the Potomac
River by the capture of Lee's army? If this be so, then Lee's
undertaking was a hazard for which there could have been no justifying
reason, and his escape from destruction was due to the inadequacy of the
men in command of the Northern armies. Following this remark I ought to
say that General Meade was a brave and patriotic officer, but he lacked
the qualities which enable a man to act promptly and wisely in great
exigencies. While General Lee was acting on the defensive did he
engage in and successfully execute any strategic movement that can be
compared with Grant's campaign of May, 1863, through Mississippi and to
the rear of Vicksburg? Or can General Wolseley cite an instance of
individual genius and power more conspicuous than the relief of our
besieged army at Chattanooga, the capture of six thousand prisoners,
forty pieces of artillery, seven thousand stands of small arms and
large quantities of other material of war?

During the period of reconstruction Alexander H. Stephens was examined
by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives as to
the condition and purposes of the South. When the examination was over
I asked him when he came to the conclusion that the South was to be
defeated. He said: "In the year 1862." I then said: "In that year
you had your successes. What were the grounds of your conclusions?"
In reply he said: "It was then that I first realized that the North
was putting its whole force into the contest, and I knew that in such
a contest we were to be destroyed."

If I were to imagine a reason, or to suggest an excuse for General Lee's
two unsuccessful aggressive campaigns, I should assume that,
simultaneously with Mr. Stephens, he had reached the conclusion that
time was on the side of the North, and that the Fabian policy must fail
in the end.

In an aggressive movement there was one chance of success. A victory
and capture of Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington might lead to an
arrangement by which the Confederacy would be recognized, or a
restoration of the Union secured upon a basis acceptable to the South.
A desperate undertaking, no doubt, but it is difficult to suggest a
more adequate re