nt
and Cabinet were of a like opinion, it may be said that there could
have been no "packing" of the Supreme Court except by the exclusion
of the two most prominent lawyers in the circuit and the appointment
of men whose opinions upon a vital question were not in harmony with
the opinion of the person making the appointment.

As to myself, I had never accepted the original decision as sound law
under the Constitution, nor as a wise public policy, if there had
been no Constitution. By the decision the Government was shorn of a
part of its financial means of defence in an exigency. When the
Supreme Court had reached a conclusion, Chief Justice Chase called
upon me and informed me of that fact, about two weeks in advance of
the delivery of the opinion. He gave as a reason his apprehension of
serious financial difficulties due to a demand for gold by the
creditor class. Not sharing in that apprehension, I said: "The
business men are all debtors as well as creditors, and they cannot
engage in a struggle over gold payments, and the small class of
creditors who are not also debtors will not venture upon a policy in
which they must suffer ultimately." The decision did not cause a
ripple in the finances of the country.

Pursuing the conversation, I asked the Chief Justice where he found
authority in the Constitution for the issue of non-legal-tender
currency. He answered in the power to borrow money and in the power
given to Congress to provide for the "general welfare of the United
States." I then said, having in mind the opinion in the case of
MacCulloch and Maryland, in which the court held that where a power
was given to Congress, its exercise was a matter of discretion unless
a limitation could be found in the Constitution: "Where do you find
a limitation to the power to borrow money by any means that to Congress
may appear wise?" The Chief Justice was unable to specify a
limitation, and the question remains unanswered to this day.

When the case of Hepburn and Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender
cases, the Chief Justice was very much disturbed, and with the
exhibition of considerable feeling, he said: "Why did you consent to
the appointment of judges to overrule me?" I assured him that there
was no personal feeling on the part of the President, and that as to
my own unimportant part in the business, he had known from the time of
our interview in regard to the former action of the court that I
enterta