ture of clerkships that he could and did control.
I can say for myself that as a member I never asserted any such right
and as the head of the Treasury I can say that no such claim was ever
made upon me by any member of Congress. The nearest approach to it was
by George W. Julian. During one of his canvasses for re-nomination,
a clerk named Smith, and a correspondent of a journal in Mr. Julian's
district, had advocated the nomination of Mr. Wilson (Jeremiah). When
Mr. Julian secured the nomination, Smith gave him his support.
Nevertheless when Julian returned to Washington he demanded Smith's
removal. After hearing all the facts I declined to act. Julian was
very indignant, and afterwards from the Astor House, New York, wrote me
a violent, I think I might say unreasonable letter.
The public mind has been much misled by the statements in regard to
removals and appointments. The employees in a department are of two
sorts. There is a class who are trained men in the places that they
occupy. They have been in the service for a long period. They are
familiar with the laws relating to their duties, and to the decisions
of the courts thereon, and they are the possessors of the traditions
of the offices. They are as nearly indispensable as one man can be
to another, or to the safe management of business. The head of a
department cannot dispense with the services of such men. All thought
of political opinions disappears. The responsibility of a change in
such a case is very great. No prudent administrator of a public trust
will venture upon such experiments. There is another class of clerks
who are employed in copying, in making computations in simple
arithmetic, in writing letters under dictation, and in other ordinary
clerical work.
The public interest is not very large in the retention of such persons.
The ordinary graduates of the high schools of the country are competent
for all those duties. But the clerks of this class are not removed in
mass, and they never will be, under any administration. Even a fresh
man at the head of a department will soon find that the fancied
political advantages are no adequate compensation for the trouble that
he assumes and the risk of error and fraud that he runs when he takes
new and untried persons in the place of those who have been tested.
As late as 1870 about thirty per cent. of the employees of the
Treasury in 1860 were in office, and this notwithstanding that the
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