energy we have to depend. One is Ducos, Minister
of Marine, a man of mere commonplace talents and character. The other is
Binneau, Minister of Finance, somewhat inferior to Ducos. Binneau ought
to provide resources. He ought to check the preposterous waste of the
Court. He has not intelligence enough to do the one, or courage enough to
attempt the other. The real Prime Minister is without doubt Louis
Napoleon himself. But he is not a man of business. He does not understand
details. He may order certain things to be done, but he will not be able
to ascertain whether the proper means have been taken. He does not know
indeed what these means are. He does not trust those who do. A war which
would have tasked all the powers of Napoleon, and of Napoleon's Ministers
and generals, is to be carried on without any master-mind to direct it,
or any good instruments to execute it. I fear some great disaster.
'Such a disaster might throw,' he continued, 'this man from the eminence
on which he is balanced, not rooted. It might produce a popular outbreak,
of which the anarchical party might take advantage. Or, what is perhaps
more to be feared, it might frighten Louis Napoleon into a change of
policy. He is quite capable of turning short round--giving up
everything--key of the Grotto, protectorate of the orthodox, even the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus--to Nicholas, and asking to be repaid by
the Rhine.
'I cannot escape from the _cauchemar_ that a couple of years hence France
and England may be at war. Nicholas's expectations have been deceived,
but his plan was not unskilfully laid. He had a fair right to conjecture
that you would think the dangers of this alliance such as to be even
greater than those of allowing him to obtain his protectorate.
'In deciding otherwise, you have taken the brave and the magnanimous
course. I hope that it may prove the successful one.
'I am sorry,' continued Tocqueville, 'to see the language of your
newspapers as to the fusion. I did not choose to take part in it. I hate
to have anything to do with pretenders. But as a mere measure of
precaution it is a wise one. It decides what shall be the conduct of the
Royalist party in the event--not an improbable one--of France being
suddenly left without a ruler.
'Your unmeasured praise of Louis Napoleon and your unmeasured abuse of
the Bourbons are, to a certain degree, the interference in our politics
which you professedly disclaim. I admit the anti-Eng
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