, and a sergeant of the 61st was shot through the head.]

[Footnote 3: Colonel Seton, 35th Native Infantry, was wounded in the
stomach in this affair.]

[Footnote 4: One man of the 61st Regiment was killed by a round-shot,
which in its course also knocked over some sandbags which sent
Lieutenant Hutton flying about seven feet.]

[Footnote 5: Lieutenant Yonge.]

[Footnote 6: On August 7 they blew up one of their own powder factories,
and with it a number of workmen.]

CHAPTER IV

CAPTURE OF THE CITY

The actual Siege of Delhi may be said to have commenced on September 7,
1857. All reinforcements that could possibly arrive had reached us with
the siege-train, and the effective force now available for operations
before Delhi consisted of the following troops:

European artillery 580
" cavalry 514
" infantry 2,672
-----
3,766

Native artillery 770
" cavalry 1,313
" infantry 3,417
Engineers, sappers, miners, etc. 722
-----
6,222
-----

Grand total 9,988

To the above must be added the Kashmir contingent of 2,200 men, with
four guns, and the cavalry of the Jhind Rajah, perhaps 400 more, making
the full amount of troops employed at the siege 12,588.

The seven regiments of European infantry were sadly reduced in numbers,
being mere skeletons, the strongest mustering 409 effective rank and
file, and the weakest only 242. There were also nearly 3,000 men in
hospital, Europeans and natives.

From the most reliable sources the enemy at this period numbered
40,000 men, all trained soldiers of the former regular army, besides
undisciplined armed hordes of fanatics and rabble of the city and
surrounding country--a formidable disproportion to our scanty force when
it is recollected that they were protected by strong fortifications
mounting upwards of fifty guns, with an unlimited supply of artillery
and munitions of war, and that with their vast numbers they had ample
opportunities of harassing our right flank and rear and cutting off
communications up-country.

Nevertheless, political considerations demanded that we should take the
offensive and deal such a blow as would convince the rebels, as well
as those whose loyalty was wavering, that the British arms were
irresistible. Moreover, there was no likelihood of our force being
increased. So on September 7 General Wilson issued the following address
to his troops:

"