e wish of Sir William Stanley that Ireland should be
subjugated first, as a basis of operations against England; but this had
been overruled. The intrigues of Mendoza and Farnese, too, with the
Catholic nobles of Scotland, had proved, after all, unsuccessful. King
James had yielded to superior offers of money and advancement held out to
him by Elizabeth, and was now, in Alexander's words, a confirmed heretic.

There was no course left, therefore, but to conquer England at once. A
strange omission had however been made in the plan from first to last.
The commander of the whole expedition was the Duke of Parma: on his head
was the whole responsibility. Not a gun was to be fired--if it could be
avoided--until he had come forth with his veterans to make his junction
with the Invincible Armada off Calais. Yet there was no arrangement
whatever to enable him to come forth--not the slightest provision to
effect that junction. It would almost seem that the letter-writer of the
Escorial had been quite ignorant of the existence of the Dutch fleets off
Dunkerk, Newport, and Flushing, although he had certainly received
information enough of this formidable obstacle to his plan.

"Most joyful I shall be," said Farnese--writing on one of the days when
he had seemed most convinced by Valentine Dale's arguments, and driven to
despair by his postulates--"to see myself with these soldiers on English
ground, where, with God's help, I hope to accomplish your Majesty's
demands." He was much troubled however to find doubts entertained at the
last moment as to his 6000 Spaniards; and certainly it hardly needed an
argument to prove that the invasion of England with but 17,000 soldiers
was a somewhat hazardous scheme. Yet the pilot Moresini had brought him
letters from Medina Sidonia, in which the Duke expressed hesitation about
parting with these 6000 veterans; unless the English fleet should have
been previously destroyed, and had also again expressed his hope that
Parma would be punctual to the rendezvous. Alexander immediately combated
these views in letters to Medina and to the King. He avowed that he would
not depart one tittle from the plan originally laid down. The 6000 men,
and more if possible, were to be furnished him, and the Spanish Armada
was to protect his own flotilla, and to keep the channel clear of
enemies. No other scheme was possible, he said, for it was clear that his
collection of small flat-bottomed river-boats and hoys co