atic Move --
The Imperial Court at Dresden -- Napoleon and Poland -- The
Health of Napoleon -- His Strategic Powers Undiminished.

[Sidenote: 1812]

Ready--at least to outward appearance, Napoleon was in truth ready as
far as equipment, organization, commissariat, strategic plan, and every
nice detail of official forethought could go. But how about the
efficiency and zeal of men and officers? There had been murmurings for
some years past. It was remarked that Napoleon's studies in 1808 were
the campaigns of Rome against the Parthians from the days of Crassus
onward; from his death-bed Lannes had warned his chief in 1809 how ready
many of his most trusted servants were to betray him if he continued his
career of conquest; Decres, another true friend, expressed his anxiety
in 1810 lest they should all be thrown into a final horrid elemental
crash; and in 1811 Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely exclaimed, "The
unhappy man will undo himself, undo us all, undo everything." The
Emperor heard neither of these last forebodings, but is doubtfully
reported to have himself declared, "I am driven onward to a goal which I
know not." Caulaincourt made no secret of how his anxiety increased as
he knew Russia better. He was recalled because, having learned Russia's
pride and Russia's resources, he made no attempt to conceal his aversion
to the final arbitrament of bloodshed. Poniatowski believed Lithuania
would refuse to rise against her despot; Segur and Duroc foresaw that
France, if degraded to be but one province of a great empire, would lose
her enthusiasm; even Fouche, having been permitted, on the plea of
ill-health, to return from his exile in Italy, ventured to draw up a
vigorous and comprehensive memorial against war, and instanced the fate
of Charles XII. The contents of Fouche's paper were divulged to Napoleon
by a spy, and when the author presented it he was met by contemptuous
sarcasm. The Emperor believed Prussia to be helpless, chiding Davout for
his doleful reports of the new temper which had been developed. Jomini
declared, but long afterward, that the great captain had avowed to a
confidential friend his eagerness for the excitement of battle.

But in spite of the anxiety felt by a few leading Frenchmen, there was
general confidence, and it was not until after the catastrophe that
details like those enumerated were recalled. It is customary to
attribute Napoleon's zeal for war to the fiery counsels of Maret