on, and the same
proofs of treachery amongst their companions. Each, too, has furnished
so many means of detection, by names of persons, dates, and places,
that,--no attempt at refutation having been made by persons
implicated,--we are to believe that they must, at any rate, contain much
that is true. Neither Ward's nor Vidocq's Memoirs are so connected as
Vaux's; but in Ward's case, this may be attributed to a want of
scholarship, as he is evidently an ignorant man; and in Vidocq's, to a
fondness for the marvellous, in consequence of which he has introduced
many episodes. These episodes, accordingly, detract from the merit of
the work, considered as a veritable narrative, they being garnished with
more of the romantic than the regular account of his own performances.

After all, a degree of suspicion will attach to each of them, from the
consideration that they are all avowed liars. If, indeed, there was
proof, either external or internal, that they had become reformed
characters, and, of course, abhorrers of deceit, we might value their
self-condemnation as evidence of truth; for what man of moral feeling
would proclaim that he had been an habitual liar, except conscious that
the avowal was incumbent on him to substantiate the truth? This was done
by Bunyan, the author of the Pilgrim's Progress, and by Cowper, the
truly Christian poet:--they are respected accordingly. But in these
narratives, except a little cant in Ward's, we find nothing approaching
to a sense of shame or remorse. Vidocq, like Homer's Ulysses, has a lie
ready for every occasion, and appears, like that hero, to regard himself
as "the man for wisdom's various arts renowned." Vaux is almost equal to
him in this respect, and exults in the success of his deceptions. If
cunning were wisdom, Ulysses, Vidocq, and Vaux, would form a trio of
eminently wise men. But this sort of wisdom, how much soever valued by
pagans, must be regarded by Christians, enlightened by the Gospel, as
utterly unjustifiable, even when employed as a means for the attainment
of some good; since they are never to do evil that good may come.
Accordingly, those persons who make lies their refuge, must be liable to
be doubted, even when they speak the truth. Still, it is possible, that
a man's conscience may be so obdurate, as not to perceive the pravity of
mendacity, when exercised for his supposed benefit, while he yet retains
a regard for truth when engaged in relating his exploits to